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ABSTRACT
A high voltage failure occurred in the
Harvard Solar Spectrometer-Spectroheliometer ex-
periment aboard the OSO-IV spacecraft five weeks
after launch. This failure is analyzed and traced
to a sequential process comprising two modes which
took place within the high voltage power supply.
The primary failure was within the transformer.
The test history of this and previous instruments
is discussed, including pertinent work on sub-
assemblies and modules. This testing included
extensive thermal-vacuum work and corona and plasma
exposure. Preventive measures that are being
taken on a later experiment to fly in August 1969 are
discussed, including pertinent recommendations in
manufacturing technique, qualification and accept-
ance tests, and an overload switch that automatically
turns off the high voltage power supply.
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INTRODUCTION
The second of a series of experiments prepared
by the Harvard Observatory for the Orbitir.g Solar
Observatory program was launched aboard OSO-IV on
October 18, 1967. After five weeks of highly
successful scientific operation , a failure occurred
in the high voltage subsystem associated with the
primary detector and permanently disabled the
instrument.
Our experience on a previous OSO and the early
stages of development of this particular instrument
were reported at the last workshop on high voltage
2
breakdown at JPL , so that it seemed pertinent to
make this follow-on report about the effectiveness
of t.he measures described at that time for avoiding
high voltage problems. This pa ->er will describe the
instrument, its test backgror^d, and the nature of
the failure that occurred in orbit. Also, certain
recommendations will be drawn based on thf.» experience
that is described.
It should be noted that although the- technology
invested in the equipment described is several years
old, this will always be the case with re.-cent flight
experiments, because they require designs and develop-
ments over a period of several years. Sin'.il?.rly, the
developments reported at this workshop and the recomm-
endations made in this paper v,ill not be fully exploited
until some time in the future.
i
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INSTRUMENT DESCRIPTION
The Harvard instrument consists basically of
a scanning spectrometer placed at the focus of a
single-element reflecting telescope.
The exterior of the instrument is shown in
Figure 1. It is approximately 4 inches by 8 inches
by 42 inches in size, weighs approximately 40 Ibs.,
and is housed in polished gold covers for proper
radiative thermal properties.
The wavelength region covered by the instrument
(300 to 1400A) explains the simplicity of the optics
shown in Figure 2. Optical efficiencies are so poor
as to prevent the use of anything except the simplest
of reflective optics. There are no optically trans-
mitting materials for these wavelengths and hence
no windows or protective envelopes can be used around
sensitive elements.
Radiation from the sun (see Figure 2) enters
an aperture and falls on a spherical telescope mirror
which focuses an image of the solar disc into the plane
of the spectrometer entrance slit. The small dimensions
of the entrance slit (approximately 150 microns square)
act as a field stop and admit the radiation from one
arc minute of the solar disc. This radiation passes
into the spectrometer and is diffracted by an original
concave grating ruled in gold. The emission line
sp.sctrum typical of this wavelength region is scanned
'•
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by rotation of the grating, bringing successive
parts of the spectrum to the exit slit. The combined
slits produce a resolution or band pass of approx-
imately 3A. The photon flux through the exit slit
is sensed by a windowless photomultiplier operating
with grounded cathode. In addition, a white light
:, sensor behind a third slit serves as an angular
reference during wavelength scan by detecting the
zero order radiation reflected from the grating.
The electronic system is shown in Figure 3 and
can be separated into three main subsystems. Shown
at the top is the command and digital control sub-
system. A digital control network (wavelength
selector) receives commands and basic spacecraft
timing pulses and in turn produces the remaining
timing signals required by the instrument. It also
controls the wavelength scanning system consisting of
a pulse shaper, stepping motor and mechanical drive.
The power distribution and housekeeping data sub-
systems are shown at the bottom of the illustration
and consist of two low-voltage power supplies, the
matrix or junction box, and various sensors.
The ultraviolet (UV) detection and primary data
subsystems are shown in the center of Figure 3 and
consist of a high voltage power supply (HVPS), temp-
erature compensated voltage divider, photomultiplier,
pulse pre-amplifier and amplifier, and finally the
16-bit binary counter/rhift register. The photo-
multiplier is a crossed-field magnetic electron
•-.—- • •
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multiplier ' produced by the Bendix Corporation.
It has a tungsten photo-cathode (insensitive to
near UV and visible light), continuous resistive
dynode and field strips, and external magnetic
field structure. It requires a high voltage of
1750 volts for proper operation and has no pro-
tective envelope.
The actual instrument configuration, with the
external covers removed, is shown in Figure 4.
Note particularly the HVFS, the UV detactor assembly,
and the connectors and cable which join them.
The instrument acquires ultraviolet data in
two fundamental forms as shown in Figure 5. At
the bottom is a typical wavelength scan of a small
central region of the solar disc from 300 to 1400A
with approximately 3A resolution. By commanding
the wavelength scan rystem to place the Land pass on
any emission line, and by activating the spatial
(i.e., azimuth and elevation) raster system of the
spacecraft, one can acquire spectroheliograms (images
in particular wavelengths) of the sun which when
reconstructed by suitable data reduction techniques
take the pictorial form ahownon the upper peirt of
the illustration.
*-'!V.I?"J*«' '"-' ' •'*»-r -'
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DEVELOPMENT AND TEST BACKGROUND
As a result of the OSO-II experience, which was
2
reported previously , effort was devoted to developing
and testing the OSO-IV instrument in order to avoid
the high voltage breakdown problems suffered isfore.
, The instrument was designed at the Harvard
Observatory, but was constructed in hybrid fashion.
Some of the modules were developed and built by
.
subcontractors, others were developed at "arvaird and
fabricated by vendors, and still other parts were
fabricated at Harvard. Instrument final assembly,
integration, and test were done at Harvard. Critical
i
subasser.bly and all final assembly were done in
Federal Class 100 clean facilities. Extraordinary
precautions were taken in design with materi?ls
i
selection and electronics piece-part usage. Elaborate
qualification and ageing procedures were used on elec-
tronic parts, and instrument handling was carefully
controlled to prevent contamination. The instrument
design was reviewed critically by several independent
groups to ensure that design detects had been
substantially eliminated.
After completion of the various model instruments,
all normal qualification and acceptance tests required
by GSFC were performed, including exposure to temperature
extremes, thermal-vacuum, vibration, acceleration, and
others. In addition, however, as a result of our
OSO-II experience a number of special tests were
*.-.•.»;
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performed on the prototype and flight models. These
explored two general areas: (i) the immunity oi the
system to external influence such as extreme temp-
erature, vacuum and plasma environments, and (ii)
the ability of the system to v !.thst<md (at least for
many hours) conditions of high voltage breakdown
without disabling damage.
Jnsensitivity to combined temperature-vacuum
conditions was tested on a number of occasions. In
addition to the normal thermal vacucnt qualification
and acceptance tests (approximately 15 days and 9 days
respectively in temperatures ranging between -1C°C
a:;d +40°C, and vacuums between 10~-> to 10-9 torr)
tho UV detector subasscrobly and the entire instrument
were subjected to hundreds of hours of vacuum and
thermal vacuum exposure in the course of normal
calibration activities. After delivery, the instrument
also underwent thermal vacuum exposure &'.; part of the
normal spacecraft acceptance tests. These testa
were thought to be more than adequate to demonstrate
immunity to vacuum conditions.
The prototypa instrument was also tested to
investigate how orbital plasma affected the performance
of the instrument^. These tests were mado at GSFC
in a facility generally like that Illustrated in
Figure 6. This testing facility is described
more completely in another paper presented at this
Workshop.
•*
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Simulated plasma densities were varied between
4 6 o10 and 10 particles/cm*. The instrument was
subjected to th'.se conditions while operating fully
and observing an ultraviolet source. The con-
clusions from the tests were that simulated orbital
plasma did not induce any high voltage discharge
during the operation of the experiment nor did it
pror5 -e any undue interaction with the detection
sys;..m. Additional exploratory tests performed
in more sensitive (non-flight) configurations
produced only moderate interactions.
Two principal types of tests were performed
to establish the degree of immunity to high voltage
breakdown conditions in the vicinity of the experi-
ment. The first was a series of "corona" tests
performed on the complete fully operating instru-
ment and separately on the HVPS. With the operating
instrument within a vacuum test chamber, the pressure
would be systematically varied between .01 and . <!0
torr. This would invariably induce spontaneous corona
within various parts of the high voltage detection
system because of the open construction mentioned
earlier. It was our goal to make the instrument immune
to damage evsn though these conditions were not expected
to be encountered in orbit. After the correction of
several design deficiencies, this immunity appeared
to be achieved, as demonstrated by many hours of
continuous exposure in the laboratory.
.- 8 -
The second type of test involved establishing
the degree of immunity of the instrument to transients
received from external sources along the various
input-output linos. This was accomplished by
introducing 1/2 millijoulo transients of 100V initial
amplitude, produced by a capacitor discharge, on each
of the input and output lines of the instrument. Again
such testing produced no apparent damage.
As a result of these tests, we were confident
at the time of launch that the instrument was immune
to the hostile factors of the immediate environment
and also to any possible brief high voltage breakdowns
within itself.
- 9 -
•FAILURE ANALYSIS
The instrument failure occurred after approx-
imately five weeks of useful service. The topography
of the spacecraft orbits associated with the failure
analysis is shown in Figure 7. A "Quick-Look" hard-
line data link had been established between the
Fort Myers STADAN (Satellite Tracking and Data
Acquisition Net) station and Goddard Space Flight
Center (GSFC), and also between GSFC and the Harvard
Observatory, to allow near-real time data coverage
from those orbits that passed over the Fort Myers
station. Only Fort Myers had this capability. As
illustrated, the failure occurred during orbit #637
on November 29^ , shortly after the last daily pass
within range of the Fort Myers station. The failure
was therefore net observed for corrective action
until 16 hours later during orbit #646; the first
pass the following day at Fort Myers. The play-back
data for the critical orbits around the point of
failure were subsequently obtained from the Johannesburg
and Santiago stations, and showed a clear record
of the events preceding and following the failure.
Data analyses and laboratory studies were performed
in considerable detail and the results are available
in a Harvard Observatory technical report . For the
purposes of this paper we will, therefore, present
enough data to depict what most probably occurred,
without the considerable substantiating evidence that
is available.
s-10- I
The principal data characteristics of this
failure were a) unusually high primary current
readings from the HVPS, b) noise in the main
digital system, and c) interaction with the mech-
anical reference (MR) circuitry which activates
a status bit in the Pulse Code Modulation (PCM)
data word and serves as a wavelength scan reference.
The data for the 50 minutes contiguous to the
time of failure are presented in summary form in
Figure 8. The basic time interval is 30.72 seconds,
which represents one cycle of the analog housekeeping
data subcorrmutator and hence one sample at the HV
primary current. This is also the equivalent of
192 Harvard data words in the PCM system. The
characteristics of normal operation of the instrument
can be observed at the left of the illustration. At
the top, the high voltage current is between 9 and 11
milliamperes with modest fluctuations. A second plot
shows the MR status bit recurring at regular
infrequent intervals in an expected manner. The
remaining two somewhat complementary presentations of
the main data output reflect normal data and the
fluctuations expected from the geometry of raster
picture operation. (Time to complete one raster
picture equals 5.12 minutes.)
An abrupt change can be seen at the time of
failure. The high voltage primary current immediately
achieves the current-limited value and is interpreted
as resulting from an excessive load on the power
supply.
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The primary data can be shown to have no statistical
correlation with the previous ultraviolet data, and
this is interpreted as a loss of high voltage to the
detector. The third characteristic is the frequent
and random triggering of the mechanical refsrer.ee
circuitry. The combined presence of these three
characteristics has beer designated as Mode I.
At the far right of the illustration a different
set of characteristics can be observed. The high
voltage primary current is still high but apparently
fluctuating randomly. The primary data system is
uniformly quiet, and there is no unusual interaction
remaining with the mechanical reference circuitry.
These characteristics have been designated collectively
as Mode II. One can observe in :.he first 35 minutes
after failure several occasions ol transition
between Mode I and Mode II. The existence of these
transitions is further demonstrated by a careful
analysis of the complete data.
Fortunately for the analysis, both a prototype
anu a spare flight instrument were available for test
and they allowed very accurate simulation of the various
presumed ir.echan.'.sms of failure.
Careful system and data analysis determined that
the counter and pulse amplifying system were operating
satisfactorily and therefore were not the source of
the noise in the main data system or of the mechanical
reference interactions.
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Laboratory tests were continued and showed that
although high voltage breakdown to a variety of
places could produce the data noise and high current,
only high voltage breakdown to the primary ground
return could additionally produce the spurious
mechanical reference indications and therefore
the Mode I condition. This was shown to result
from the close physical proximity of the primary
return wire and the mechanical reference circuit
input line within the matrix or junction box.(See
Figure 9)
The identification of Mode II is a bit mere
difficult. When the presumed breakdown path was
reduced to a short circuit to the primary, the noise
and mechanical reference interaction disappeared,
but the current remained high and stable. Further
testing demonstrated that the additional Mode II
characteristic (i.e., oscillation of the supply
primary) was present only when the capacitor Cl
was open circuited and the effective resistance on
the secondary was low or zero. When the effective
resistance was high, Mode I characteristics were
still present even though capacitor Cl was open.
Capacitor Cl is a 35-volt tantalum capacitor
which has been shown in the laboratory to become
open-circuited at very modest voltages, especially
in the inverted polarity.
The high voltage is close to the primary ground
return in two principal places, both within the high
••
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voltage power supply, which is illustrated in Figure 10,
One of these places is within the transformer module
and the other is a point where a pin servicing the
high voltage enable plug and a copper printed-circuit
conductor are closely adjacent. This second potential
breakdown path is impeded by a physical separation
and a conformal epoxy coating on the printed circuit
board, and is thought to be improbable.
The remaining potential breakdown area is the
transformer illustrated in Figure 11. It consists of
an aluminum core box which is wrapped in Teflon
tape overlayed with the primary winding. This is
again wrapped with Teflon and the secondary applied.
The finished transfoinnnr is finally wrapped in Teflon
tape and then conformally coated with General Electric
RTV-11 silicon rubber at atmospheric pressure. As
reported by the manufacturer, the transformer is
assembled into a module and the entire module is
encapsulated with Armstrong C-7 epoxy after having
been degassed at a pressure of approximately 20 torr.
The module is released to atmospheric pressure prior
to curing. From elementary pressure-volume relation-
ships, one can show that the gas (namely air) trapped
within the transformer by virtue of the RTV seal is
at a pressure of 20 t/jrr if no penetration of the
encapsulant occurred, or at some higher pressure if
penetration did occur.
With the information available we can reconstruct
the probable failure mechanisms of orbit #637.
'• -
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Following the launch of the instrument, the air
trapped within the transformer by the manufacturing
process gradually leaked or c.iffused out of the
module until its pressure reached a value favorable
to high voltage breakdown between the leads or windings
of the primary and secondary.
Such breakdown then occurred, producing the
Mode I condition and producing large transients on
the primary return line. These transients, aggravated
by the presence of the inductor and series resistor
in that leg, caused the capacitor Cl to open. As
the breakdown condition continued, interaction
developed with the irjterials of the transformer,
wl'ich reduced the resistance paths first intermittently
and then more permanently, and eventually produced
the Mode II condition.
A number of other possible related factors
were brought int.o the analysis and considered. These
included unusual variations in the instrument temp-
erature, the observed passages through the South
Atlantic Anomaly which resulted in data system noise,
the occurrence of solar flares in the period before
failure, and the observation of a variety of anomalies
in spacecraft performance. All of these have been
studied and none have been shown to have any bearing
on the observed failure.
_' . • .
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RECOMMENDATIONS
In view of the specific experience with our
OSO-IV experiment we have formulated recommendations
for our future flight experiments. Our OSO-Gl
program, the next instrument to fly, will use the
spare flight instrument from OSO-IV with a few mod-
ifications to improve its scientific capabilities.
Obviously, the problems in the high voltage section
have to be prevented from recurring and that they
have been prevented has to be proved by meaningful
testing. Our recommendations now are:
First, the manufacturing techniques used in the
transformer section must be improved. This has been
done in cooperation with Transformer Electronics
Company (TEC) of Boulder, Colorado. The goal was to
avoid high electric fields by proper winding, and to
encapsulate the transformer thoroughly. Mr. Byers
of TEC has discussed the methods errployed in these
areas in a paper presented at this Workshop**.
In addition, for further confidence we ordered
supolies of similar capability from Electro-Mechanical
Research of Princeton, New Jersey, whose units stem
from a well developed design. Ideally, the power
supply with the best pre-launch performance record
would be flown but it appears now that only one will
be available in time.
Second, we recommend qualification and accept-
- 16 -
ance tests which go beyond even the extra testing
requirements imposed on our CSO-1V instrument, such
as plasma, corona, and spike tests. Besides these
and the conventional vibration and thermal-vacuum
tests, there appears to be a definite need for
extended vacuum exposure of high voltage equipment.
By this we mean tests at orbital pressures for full
desired life times. Preferably, the entire instrument
should successfully pass a vacuum exposure test for
the period of the mission. This, however, is pro-
hibitive in most missions for several reasons,,
including the resulting delay of the launch and the
financial aspects of lengthening the schedule. The
increased obsolescence of an experiment due to the
time required to perform such t^sts is also significant
Nevertheless, high-vacuum life tests for qualification
of high voltage equipment, performed on a statistically
meaningful sample, should be required. Flight units
should be tested for unit acceptance by an operational
vacuum exposure for the minimum desired life time.
Third, we recommend the use of an overload-
sensitive circuit which protects the instrument by
turning off the high voltage power supply immediately
in case of overload. This will probably prevent
irreversible damage to the electronics that would occur
during prolonged operation under faulty conditions.
As shown in Figure 12 the load (i.e., the input current)
is sensed across a 10ft resistance in the +19V input
line. The nominal voltage drop across this resistor
is approximately .17V and therefore insignificant.
i
\
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The trip point is specified as an rms load 50%
above nominal for a time exceeding 100 ms. This
load level is, of course, below the level corres-
ponding to the current limited operation of the
power supply. Also, short transients which may be
induced from outside the experiment will not turn
off the high voltage supply, because they are excluded
by the time delay. The status of the overload
protection is transmitted by telemetry. A most
important aspect is the capability to override the
sensing circuit and thus keep the instrument from
being disabled by a malfunction in a safety device.
Lastly, v/e recommend a carefully developed
progressive turn-on plan in orbit. Time should be
taken to follow a systematic approach, starting with
a check-out of low voltage systems and, cfter an
appropriate outgassing period, short periods of high
voltage turn-on. The periods of high voltage
exercise are lengthened until acceptable permanent
operation has been established. A Quick-Look cap-
ability is indispensable for this work. On OSO-IV
high voltage was turned on the first time for 5
seconds after approximately 140 hours in orbit (i.e.,
after nearly 6 days). By synchronizing this five-
second period so that it included a telemetry reading
of the HVPS input current, we obtained enouyh data
to establish the perfect performance of the entire
detection system. Since the data were received in
real time, we could evaluate them immediately and
•I
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progress more rapidly through. The overload pro-
tection in OSO-G1 should take care of some of the
problems we were concerned about in OSO-IV, namely-
irreversible damage in case of a breakdown. None-
theless, we will follow a similar turn-on schedule
again as a matter of sound practice.
.I
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CONCLUSION
As long as instruments such as ours continue
to require open high voltnge systems for detection,
there will continue to be a critical concern about
high voltage breakdown. We have described our most
j
recent experiences and the additional precautions
'.o be exercised on the next flight. Eventually,
through such experience, and through exchange of
information in Workshops such as this, the handling
of high voltage exposed to vacuum may become a
routine matter.
- 20 -
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